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I. INTRODUCTION 
Election operations in democracies have long been an area of 
debate and controversy.  It is hard to find a time in recent history, 
however, when the issue has been so politically charged and rife 
with accusations, extensive documentation, up-to-the-minute 
reporting, and dashes to a courthouse.  Few election statistics are as 
telling as the sudden rise in lawsuits in just eight years:  from 1996 
to 1999, the average number of election challenge lawsuits was 
ninety-six per year; by 2001 to 2004, this number had more than 
doubled to an average of 254 lawsuits per year.1  What was once a 
bad joke on Election day, “vote early and often,”2 now has a 
modern twist: litigate early and often.3
These problems stem largely from the structure in which 
elections are overseen in the various states of the union.  By and 
large, the United States subscribes to partisan oversight of its 
elections.4  While this tradition is time-honored, the combination of 
closely-divided national elections, rapid information accessibility, 
and the influx of pre-election lawsuits has caused a palpable feeling 
that U.S. elections are increasingly skewed toward the party in 
power.5  The traditional solution of checks and balances—in the 
 1. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958 (2005). 
 2. This quote is attributed to former Chicago Mayors William Hale 
Thompson (1915–23; 1931–35) and Richard J. Daley (1955–76), as well as mobster 
Al Capone.  Speculation is that the phrase was invented by Thompson and copied 
by Daley and Capone.  Source of “Vote Early and Often,” at http://www.cs.hmc. 
edu/~geoff/classes/hmc.cs070.200401/votequote.html (last visited Nov. 23, 
2007). 
 3. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, 
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1243 
(2005).  Professor Tokaji uses the phrase “sue early, sue often.”  Id.   
 4. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 974 (“No state currently elects [its chief 
elections officer] through a nonpartisan election.”).  The U.S. is now in the 
minority in this regard among democracies of the world: 
More than half of the world’s democracies use independent officials or 
commissions to administer elections, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
India, Iraq, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and the United Kingdom.  
Another quarter of the world’s democracies allow the government to 
manage elections but have an oversight body composed primarily of 
judges, including France, Germany, Spain, Argentina, Japan, New 
Zealand and Israel. 
SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER 
SUPPRESSION 34 (2006). 
        5.   David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf, & Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote?  
Election Administration, Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 5 
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form of a judicial order to the executive office overseeing the 
election—is becoming less effective as complex legal issues arise 
shortly before elections, making reasoned decision making almost 
impossible.  Indeed, in the 2004 general election, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice John Paul Stevens (in his role as Circuit Justice) 
refused to intervene in an Ohio election dispute simply because 
time had run out.6
With these problems and perceptions, Minnesota would do 
well to review its own system of election oversight.  Minnesota has 
seen its fair share of election litigation since 2000.7  At the same 
time, no studies have assessed whether Minnesotans in particular 
feel a real concern about the fairness of their elections.  
Commentators and commissions in the United States have 
recommended that election officials adopt a code of conduct or 
conflict of interest rules to stop the growing perception of 
partisanship and partial election oversight.8  Additionally, other 
parties have proposed drastic changes, ranging from making the 
Secretary of State an appointed position to abolishing the position 
altogether in favor of an oversight board.9  Minnesota’s neighbor, 
Wisconsin, has had an appointed election oversight board for over 
twenty years.10  Wisconsin is now replacing that election oversight 
board with a new board comprised of current and former state 
judges who will be selected by appellate judges, nominated by the 
Governor, and confirmed by two-thirds of the State Senate.11
There is little question following the 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections that problems of perception are real and 
measurable in the U.S. electoral process.  The real question for 
Minnesota voters and lawmakers is whether such problems are 
temporary and should be “waited out,” or institutional and must be 
addressed. 
ELECTION L.J. 447, 450 (2006) (“[T]he party affiliation of election officials can 
have noticeable effects on voting and elections.”) 
 6. See Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301 (2004) (mem.) (denying application 
to vacate a Sixth Circuit order without referral to the full Court). 
       7.    See infra Part III.C. 
       8.    See infra Part V.B.1. 
       9.    See infra Part V.B.2-3.   
     10.    See infra Part V.B.3.  
     11.    Id. 
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II. ELECTION OVERSIGHT IN MINNESOTA 
Minnesota’s Secretary of State is elected through a partisan 
process and functions as the chief elections officer in the state, like 
those of the majority of other states.12  The state constitution 
establishes the Secretary of State as an elected position within the 
executive department,13 charged with reporting returns in every 
election for statewide office.14  As the chief election official for the 
state, the Secretary of State has broad authority to provide 
information regarding state election laws and instructions, prepare 
and provide voting instruction posters and pamphlets to all county 
auditors, provide for voter education and a voter information 
telephone line, provide for election administration training of 
county auditors, and enter into a statewide contract to provide 
county auditors with election supplies.15  Every ten years, the 
Secretary of State coordinates information sharing among local 
officials regarding the redistricting of election districts and the 
establishment of election precincts.16
Perhaps by virtue of his or her position as the sole chief 
elections officer in Minnesota, the Secretary of State can easily 
become a lightning rod for controversy and political allegations, 
whether real or imagined.17
III. INCREASING ACRIMONY IN ELECTIONS 
Recent elections have been decided by razor thin margins, 
increasing focus on the role of the nation’s Secretaries of State and 
their decision making, thus leading to substantial controversy and 
litigation.  Although the 2000 presidential election in Florida 
brought election oversight in that state to a quick head, election 
controversies in Ohio and Minnesota have been simmering for a 
number of years.  Indeed, the chief election officials in these two 
 12. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 974 (noting that thirty-three states have a 
statewide election official (often called the Secretary of State) who is elected 
through a partisan election process). 
 13. MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
 14. Id. art. VII, § 8. 
 15. MINN. STAT. § 204B.27 (2006). 
 16. Id. § 204B.146. 
 17. E.g., Mark Brunswick, Ritchie Dispute Cloaks a Deeper Partisan Enmity, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 23, 2007; Mark Brunswick, Secretary of State Should Resign, 
GOP Chair Says, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 22, 2007; Mike Mosedale, Some 
Things About Mary: Her Critics Say She’s a Party Hack.  She Prefers to be Called Madam 
Secretary, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Sept. 8, 2004. 
4
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states alone were involved in nearly twenty lawsuits or election 
process disputes between 2000 and 2006.18
A. Florida (2000) 
Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, a Republican, 
gained national notoriety for her dual role as the chief election 
official as well as the co-chair of her state’s Bush for President 
campaign.19  Leading up to Election day in 2000, Secretary Harris 
made several controversial decisions, including purging voter lists, 
deciding not to extend the time period allowed for filing recount 
protests, and not accepting late-filed returns from counties “after a 
court gave her discretion to do so.”20  Indeed, Secretary Harris’s 
relationship with the Bush campaign during the 2000 election 
remains a source of controversy.21
Whether Secretary Harris’s actions in 2000 were politically 
motivated is not really the issue; her party affiliation and her 
position in the Bush campaign raised perception issues that have 
never gone away: 
 Apply the very cliché, but accurate phrase “perception is 
reality” to Katherine Harris’s behavior in her capacity as 
Secretary of State.  Harris was accused of allowing her 
decisions to be orchestrated by Bush’s national campaign 
strategists.  According to partisans for Gore, she did not 
perform her responsibilities as a duly elected official 
representing the people of the State, but acted as a 
Republican party loyalist.  Critics of Harris support this 
claim by pointing out that Harris was intimately involved 
in Bush’s presidential campaign.  Harris co-chaired the 
Florida Bush campaign, took time from her position as 
      18.    See infra Part III.B–C.    
        19. ANDREW GUMBEL, STEAL THIS VOTE 211 (2005); Pamela M. Prah, State 
Election Officials Steer Neutral in 2008, STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 22, 2007, at 
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=234017. 
      20. Hasen, supra note 1, at 978 (citing ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 
2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 46–
51, 56–60 (2001); see also GUMBEL, supra note 199, at 211–12; OVERTON, supra note 
4, at 30–31. 
      21. See GUMBEL, supra note 199, at 211 (noting email correspondence 
between Harris and Governor Jeb Bush that has since been erased); JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000 
ELECTION 62, 70–82 (2002) (noting an election night telephone conversation 
between Secretary Harris and Governor Jeb Bush); see also OVERTON, supra note 4, 
at 30–32. 
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Secretary of State to campaign for Bush in New 
Hampshire and served as delegate to the Philadelphia 
Republican convention [in 2000].22
B. Ohio (2004) 
In 2004, Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell was the subject 
of similar criticism for his dual role as chief elections official and 
chairman of the Ohio Bush for President campaign.23  Indeed, 
Secretary Blackwell’s decisions led to various controversies 
including no fewer than twelve lawsuits over Ohio elections 
pertaining to voting equipment, registration forms, provisional 
voting, photo identification requirements, challenges to voter 
eligibility, and long lines at polling locations.24  In September 2004, 
Secretary Blackwell received criticism nationwide for his decision 
requiring that “Ohio registration forms be printed on ‘white, 
uncoated paper of not less than 80 lb. text weight’ (i.e., the heavy-
stock paper used for cards).”25  This decision appeared directly 
counter to the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition against voting 
restrictions based on “paper relating to any . . . registration” that is 
not material in determining whether the individual is a qualified 
voter.26
A notable last-minute run to the courthouse occurred during 
Secretary Blackwell’s oversight of the 2004 election.  Two lawsuits 
were brought to stop officials (including Secretary Blackwell) from 
allowing Republican Party challengers, as permitted by statute, to 
be present at the polls on Election day. 27  The plaintiffs contended 
that the use of challengers was geared almost exclusively at the 
African-American population.  They presented the district court 
 22. Ann Shorstein, Politicizing the Election Process: “The Katherine Harris Effect,” 2 
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 373, 377 (2001). 
 23. Prah, supra note 199; GUMBEL, supra note 199, at 281. 
 24. See Tokaji, supra note 3, at 1220. 
 25. Id. at 1227 (citing DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-31 FROM J. KENNETH BLACKWELL, 
OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE 1 (Sept. 7, 2004) (directed to all County Board of 
Election Members, Directors, and Deputy Directors), available at 
http://www.electiontruth.org/lib/downloads/bookdocs/1-041_80lb_paper_ 
directive.doc); see also GUMBEL, supra note 199, at 281. 
 26. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 1227 (citing Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1971(a)(2)(B) (2000)). 
 27. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004); Summit 
County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 549 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. 
Blackwell, No. 04-4311 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004)). 
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with evidence that “14% of new voters in a majority white location 
will face a challenger . . . but 97% of new voters in a majority 
African-American voting location will see such a challenger.”28  On 
the day before the election, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio enjoined “all Defendants from allowing 
any challengers other than election judges and other electors into 
the polling places throughout the state of Ohio on Election Day.”29  
On petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
however, the appellate court entered an emergency stay of the 
district court’s injunction, noting the competing interests of 
allowing registered voters to vote freely as well as “permitting 
legitimate statutory processes to operate to preclude voting by 
those who are not entitled to vote.”30
The plaintiffs then made a last-minute dash to U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice John Paul Stevens who declined to intervene: 
With just several hours left before the first voters will make 
their way to the polls, the plaintiffs have applied to me in 
my capacity as Circuit Justice to enter an order reinstating 
the District Courts’ injunctions.  While I have the power to 
grant the relief requested, I decline to do so for 
prudential reasons. 
 Although the hour is late and time is short, I have 
reviewed the District Court opinions and the opinions of 
the Circuit Judges.  That reasonable judges can disagree 
about the issues is clear enough. 
 The allegations of abuse made by the plaintiffs are 
undoubtedly serious—the threat of voter intimidation is 
not new to our electoral system—but on the record before 
me it is impossible to determine with any certainty the 
ultimate validity of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
 Practical considerations, such as the difficulty of 
digesting all of the relevant filings and cases, and the 
challenge of properly reviewing all of the parties’ 
submissions as a full Court in the limited timeframe 
available, weigh heavily against granting the extraordinary 
relief requested here.  Moreover, I have faith that the 
elected officials and numerous election volunteers on the 
 28. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
 29. Id. at 538. 
 30. Summit County, 388 F.3d at 551. 
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ground will carry out their responsibilities in a way that 
will enable qualified voters to cast their ballots. 
 Because of the importance of providing the parties with 
a prompt decision, I am simply denying the applications 
to vacate stays without referring them to the full Court.31
Simply put, the parties had run out of time. 
The sum total of all of this litigation alongside Secretary 
Blackwell’s active political role in the presidential campaign is, 
again, a serious perception problem in the state’s elections office: 
Although at least some of [Blackwell’s] . . . decisions 
might be defended on the merits, Blackwell’s role as an 
elected Republican planning to run for higher office, with 
his close connection with the Bush campaign to boot, 
could only have fueled the perception that he was 
anything but a neutral arbiter.32
C. Minnesota (2000–2006) 
Minnesota’s recent history has also seen several lawsuits 
challenging election decisions of the Secretary of State.  Former 
Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer, a Republican, was sued four 
times from 2000 to 2006, each on the eve of an election.  In 
Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer,33 three individuals (including the Chair of the 
Minnesota DFL Party) filed suit to challenge several of Secretary 
Kiffmeyer’s ballot-access decisions following the death of U.S. 
Senator Paul Wellstone in a plane crash, eleven days before the 
2002 general election.34  The Minnesota Supreme Court issued a 
decision on October 31, 2002, ordering Secretary Kiffmeyer to mail 
replacement ballots to absentee voters “who had been mailed 
ballots before Senator Wellstone’s death and who requested a 
replacement absentee ballot and supplemental ballot.”35  The court 
reasoned that the statute on which Secretary Kiffmeyer based her 
refusal to provide replacement ballots to absentee voters violated 
equal protection.36
 31. Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1302–03 (2004) (mem.) (citation 
omitted). 
 32. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 1250. 
 33. 659 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 2003). 
 34. Id. at 726. 
 35. Id. at 727. 
 36. Id. at 734–35. 
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In re Candidacy of Independence Party Candidates v. Kiffmeyer37 
dealt with three Independence Party nominees who petitioned the 
court for an order compelling Secretary Kiffmeyer to place their 
names on the 2004 general election ballot.38  Secretary Kiffmeyer 
had refused to do so because her interpretation of the applicable 
statute was that none of the candidates had received the requisite 
minimum number of votes in the primary election.39  While sticking 
to her position throughout the litigation, the Secretary and her 
counsel, the Minnesota Attorney General, also acknowledged that 
no rational purpose was being served by Minnesota’s primary 
threshold law—a circumstance noted by the court as “unusual.”40  
As such, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the statute as 
violating the Independence Party candidates’ “constitutional rights 
to vote and to associate for the advancement of political beliefs 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and ordered 
Secretary Kiffmeyer to place the candidates on the 2004 general 
election ballot.41
Also in 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Congress of American Indians, and several individuals sued 
Secretary Kiffmeyer to compel her to accept photographic tribal 
identification cards as proof of identity and residency for the 
purpose of voter registration on election day.42  Secretary Kiffmeyer 
had argued that Minnesota law43 prohibited the use of such cards to 
show identity and residence when the holder did not actually reside 
on their tribal reservation.44  The plaintiffs, however, cited the Help 
America Vote Act,45 which explicitly allows an individual to present 
a “government document that shows the name and address of the 
voter.”46  Five days before the 2004 general election, Chief Judge 
James M. Rosenbaum of the U.S. District Court for Minnesota 
found that the statute on which Secretary Kiffmeyer relied violated 
equal protection.47  Furthermore, he issued a temporary restraining 
 37. 688 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 2004). 
 38. Id. at 855. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 861. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ACLU v. Kiffmeyer, No. 04-CV-4653 (MJR/FLN), 2004 WL 2428690 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 28, 2004). 
 43. MINN. STAT. § 201.061 (2002) (amended 2005). 
 44. ACLU, 2004 WL 2428690, at *1. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 46. ACLU, 2004 WL 2428690, at *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2000)). 
 47. Id. at *3–4. 
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order to compel Secretary Kiffmeyer to accept identification cards 
issued by federally-recognized American Indian tribes as sufficient 
proof of identity and residency (or with a current utility bill if no 
address or current address is shown on the card) for voter 
registration “without regard to whether the tribal members live on 
or off their tribal reservations.”48
Although some might argue that the temporary restraining 
order issued against Secretary Kiffmeyer five days before the 2004 
election was cutting it close, it is hard to imagine a much closer call 
than the 2006 general election.  On election day in 2006, students 
living on campus at the University of Minnesota were turned away 
from the polls for not having sufficient proof of residence.49  
According to reports, Secretary Kiffmeyer upheld the decision 
regarding proof of the students’ residency, which caused the 
matter to be brought on an emergency petition that afternoon in 
Hennepin County District Court.50  The court overruled Secretary 
Kiffmeyer’s decision and ordered that one of the polling places at 
the University of Minnesota remain open an extra hour.51  
Nevertheless, reports indicated that approximately 100 people were 
turned away and only six people returned to vote following the 
judge’s order extending the polling time.52
D. Looking Ahead to 2008 
None of the three Secretaries of State identified above remain 
in office.  From her position as Florida Secretary of State, Katherine 
Harris was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 200253 
and was subsequently defeated in a 2006 bid for the U.S. Senate.54  
Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell ran for Governor of Ohio in 
2006 and was defeated by then-Congressman Ted Strickland.55  
 48. Id. 
 49. Kathryn Nelson, Melrose Residents Unable to Vote Tuesday, MINN. DAILY, Nov. 
9, 2006, available at http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2006/11/09/69813. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Harris, Boyd Victorious in Fla. Congressional Races, USATODAY.COM, Nov. 3, 
2004, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-fl-
ushouse-harris_x.htm. 
 54. Kevin Begos, Nelson Overwhelmingly Defeats Harris, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 8, 
2006, at 17. 
 55. Lisa A. Abraham, Strickland Wins; Not Even Close, Victory Ends 16-year 
Republican Hold on Governor’s Office, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), Nov. 8, 2006, at A1. 
10
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Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer was defeated in her 
2006 bid for re-election by Mark Ritchie, a Democrat.56
Nevertheless, partisan activity by other Secretaries of State 
around the U.S. remains alive and well.  The current president of 
the National Association of Secretaries of State, Indiana Secretary 
of State Todd Rokita, has signed on as co-chair of his state’s finance 
committee for the Mitt Romney for President campaign.57  Rokita 
also commented that “[i]t is Republicans under God that will save 
this country if it is to be saved.”58  The Secretaries of State of Rhode 
Island and Arkansas have endorsed Hillary Clinton for President.59  
The Secretaries of State of Arizona and South Carolina have 
endorsed John McCain for President.60  Utah’s Lieutenant 
Governor Gary Herbert also serves as that state’s chief election 
official and has endorsed Mitt Romney.61  At the same time, the 
following Secretaries of State “have voluntarily refused to serve on 
political campaign committees or to publicly endorse candidates 
for office: Connecticut, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Vermont.”62
In light of this patchwork of political involvement—some 
Secretaries of State openly endorsing partisan candidates in 
elections they will oversee, while others refusing to do so—one has 
to ask: why is such partisanship necessarily bad?  Aside from the 
issues of perception raised by commentators about Secretaries 
Harris and Blackwell, one study found that in 2004, partisan 
election officials were more likely to accept provisional ballots in 
areas that were heavily partisan for their party (i.e., Democratic 
 56. Robert Franklin, Turnover of State Offices is One for the History Books, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 9, 2006, at 4B. 
 57. Ian Urbina, Voting Officials Face New Rules to Bar Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 2007, at A1. 
 58. Nate Smith, Secretary of State addresses GOP, WASH. TIMES-HERALD, Apr. 13, 
2007. 
 59. See Prah, supra note 199 (reporting Rhode Island Secretary of State A. 
Ralph Mollis endorses Clinton); Press Release, Hillary Clinton 2008 Presidential 
Campaign, Arkansas Leaders Endorse Clinton (June 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=2141 (noting Arkansas 
Secretary of State Charlie Daniels endorses Hillary Clinton). 
 60. Prah, supra note 19. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  It should be noted that this information comes from a National 
Association of Secretaries of State survey of members in which twenty-five offices 
responded.  Id.  Further, four states (Colorado, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Virginia) 
limit their chief election officials’ political activity, and Wisconsin requires that the 
chief elections official and all state board of elections staff be nonpartisan.  Id. 
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election officials were more likely to accept provisional ballots in 
highly Democratic precincts).63  The researchers concluded that 
“[t]he results are consistent with a theory that election officials may 
work at the margins to influence voter turnout in ways that benefit 
their political party.”64
IV. NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS BY THE NUMBERS: SHAKEN 
BY PARTISANSHIP? 
Statistics and polls bear out the concern that partisan activity 
and public perception has a direct effect on national confidence in 
elections.  Following the 2000 presidential election crisis, a national 
Commission on Federal Election Reform was convened and co-
chaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former U.S. 
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III.65  The Commission’s report 
issued in September 2005 is commonly known as the “Carter-Baker 
Report” and cites to widespread concern over a loss of confidence 
in American elections.  Indeed, the report notes: 
On the eve of the November 2004 election, a New York 
Times poll reported that only one-third of the American 
people said that they had a lot of confidence that their 
votes would be counted properly, and 29 percent said they 
were very or somewhat concerned that they would 
encounter problems at the polls.66
A Rasmussen Poll conducted just before the 2004 presidential 
election found that fifty-eight percent of Americans were 
concerned that the election would be another “Florida-style mess.”67
Research conducted by American National Election Studies 
from 1996 to 2004 sought to gauge Americans’ sentiments about 
presidential elections: 
In 1996, about 9.6% of the public (7.5% of Democrats 
and 12% of Republicans) thought the manner of 
conducting the most recent presidential election was 
    63.  Kimball, et al., supra note 5, at 459. 
    64.  Id. 
    65.  See COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN 
U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM III 
(2005) [hereinafter CARTER-BAKER REPORT], available at http://www.american.edu 
/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2007). 
    66.  Id. at 1. 
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“somewhat unfair” or “very unfair.”  The number 
skyrocketed to 37% of the public (44% of Democrats and 
25% of Republicans) in 2000 following the Florida 
debacle.  By 2004, the number fell to a still worrisome 
13.6% of the public holding strongly negative views of 
American election administration.  The gap between the 
view of Democrats (21.5%) and Republicans (2.9%) 
remains quite large.68
Professor Richard Hasen69 has noted that the sentiment of the 
“losing” party in an election is particularly telling, and perhaps the 
reason why so many more Democrats compared to Republicans feel 
that presidential elections are unfair is simply because the 
Republicans have won.70  Indeed, when the shoe was on the other 
foot in the 2004 Washington gubernatorial election where, after 
three recounts, Democrat Christine Gregoire won by 130 votes out 
of 2.9 million ballots cast,71 it was Republicans who found the 
process unfair: “In a January 2005 Elway Poll of Washington voters, 
68% of Republicans thought the state election process was unfair, 
compared to 27% of Democrats and 46% of Independents.”72  The 
question, then, is how do we preserve confidence in our elections 
regardless of who wins? 
V. WAYS TO PROTECT IMPARTIAL ELECTION OVERSIGHT 
A. Why Not Leave Well Enough Alone? 
In the absence of any reform, the current framework of filing a 
lawsuit to challenge an election official’s decision remains 
available.  Yet the problems of running to court on the eve of an  
 
 68. Hasen, supra note 1, at 942–43. 
 69. Professor Hasen is William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law at 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA, and one of the nation’s leading experts on 
election law.  Professor Hasen also manages an election and political law blog, 
Election Law, at http://electionlawblog.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). 
 70. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 943–44. 
 71. Blaine Harden, In Washington State, Democrat Wins Race, WASH. POST, Dec. 
24, 2004, at A4. 
 72. Hasen, supra note 1, at 943; see also GUMBEL, supra note 199, at 294 (“The 
Republican faithful amassed outside the statehouse in Olympia and made 
unflattering comparisons between their gubernatorial race and the blatant vote 
fraud under international scrutiny in the first round of Ukraine’s ultimately rerun 
presidential election.”). 
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election as well as the risk of a decision that “obfuscates” more than 
“clarifies” are very real.73
Secretaries Blackwell and Kiffmeyer both received injunctions 
overruling their decisions literally hours before the polls opened.74  
The injunction against Secretary Blackwell regarding challengers 
was then stayed as the clock was ticking toward the polls opening; 
one of the reasons given by the Sixth Circuit for its stay was the 
“strong public interest in smooth and effective administration of 
the voting laws that militates against changing the rules in the 
hours immediately preceding the election.”75  Indeed, Justice John 
Paul Stevens’s sense of restraint is palpable in his refusal to 
intervene in Ohio’s election-eve battle, noting that the question was 
brought to him “[w]ith just several hours left before the first voters 
will make their way to the polls . . . .”76  In Minnesota, one polling 
location was kept open an extra hour by court order in 2006, but 
the effectiveness of the order is dubious.77
One of the best examples of a lawsuit leading to an 
unintended result occurred in Mississippi.  The Mississippi 
Democratic Party filed suit in 2006 to close the state’s primary 
election to prevent people who were not registered members of 
their political party from voting in the primary election.78  In a 
decision that threw many people for a loop, U.S. District Judge 
Allen Pepper granted the Party’s request but ordered that every 
voter must re-register as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent 
before the 2008 elections.79  Judge Pepper has since amended his 
decision to extend the deadlines set forth in the original order—
but not to change the re-registration requirement—and to allow 
additional parties to intervene as the litigation moves forward.80  
 73. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 1243. 
 74. See Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 
388 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing injunctions granted in Blackwell); see 
also ACLU v. Kiffmeyer, No. 04-CV-4653, 2004 WL 2428690 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 
2004).  
 75. Summit County, 388 F.3d at 551. 
 76. Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2004). 
 77. See Nelson, supra note 499 (reporting that approximately 100 people had 
been turned away from the polls and only six returned following issuance of the 
court order). 
 78. Miss. State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 491 F. Supp. 2d 641, 645 (N.D. 
Miss. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-60667 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2007). 
 79. Id. at 662. 
 80. Miss. State Democratic Party v. Barbour, No. 4:06CV29-P-B, 2007 WL 
2071800, at *7–8 (N.D. Miss. July 17, 2007). 
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Nevertheless, the decision has been called “a real catastrophe” and 
“a big cloud over the state.”81  The Democratic Party’s hope to tidy 
up Mississippi’s primary election system led to a much broader 
decision requiring every voter in the state to be re-registered. 
B. Options for Reform 
With the uncertainty and risk of litigation, an increasing 
number of observers have proposed changes.  Options for reform 
have generally taken the form of (1) ethics codes placed on 
election officials, (2) changing the election official’s position from 
an elected to an appointed position, and (3) governing elections 
via a commission rather than a single individual. 
1. Instituting Ethics Codes for State Election Officials 
Pointing to the pervasive appearance of partiality in elections, 
the Carter-Baker Commission recommends that election officials 
adopt a code of conduct “to avoid any activity, public or private, 
that might indicate support or even sympathy for a particular 
candidate, political party, or political tendency.”82 This 
recommendation has been echoed by Commissioner Ray Martinez 
of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, who has proposed that 
states adopt “conflict-of-interest rules to govern the activities of 
state election officials.”83
To that end, U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein has introduced a 
bill in Congress that would amend the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 to prohibit a state’s chief election official from taking “an 
active part in political management or in a political campaign with 
respect to any election for Federal office over which such official 
has supervisory authority.”84  This prohibition would preclude the 
official from serving as a member of an authorized Federal 
candidate’s committee, making public comments in support of or 
opposed to any Federal candidate in an official capacity, 
fundraising for a Federal candidate, and providing Federal election 
 81. Mary Perez, Voter Reform Is a Key Issue in Race for Secretary of State, S. MISS. 
SUN HERALD, July 30, 2007, at A6. 
 82. CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 65, at 52. 
 83. Steven F. Huefner & Daniel P. Tokaji, Independent Election Administration: 
Who Counts the Votes?  Who Draws the Lines?, 5 ELECTION L.J. 410, 411 (2006). 
 84. Ballot Integrity Act, S. 1487, 110th Cong. § 325 (2007); see also Count 
Every Vote Act, H.R. 1381, 110th Cong. § 319A (2007). 
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information to any candidate that is not provided to every 
candidate.85
Similarly, the Ohio Legislature recently passed a law to restrict 
that state’s Secretary of State from serving as a campaign treasurer 
or any other official capacity for any federal, state, or local 
campaign committee other than the Secretary’s own committee.86
At present, the only statutory restriction on political activity by 
the Minnesota Secretary of State is the general prohibition on 
political activity by all state employees: 
An employee or official of the state or of a political 
subdivision may not use official authority or influence to 
compel a person to apply for membership in or become a 
member of a political organization, to pay or promise to 
pay a political contribution, or to take part in political 
activity.87
Although ethical restrictions on a Secretary of State or other 
election official have some initial attraction, such proposals remain 
subject to First Amendment challenges.  Indiana Secretary of State 
and current president of the National Association of Secretaries of 
State Todd Rokita has stated that “[j]ust because you are elected to 
office doesn’t mean you check your constitutional right to free 
speech at the door.”88  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002 
struck down Minnesota’s canon of judicial conduct that prohibited 
candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on 
disputed legal or political issues, holding that such a restriction 
violated the First Amendment.89
Further, even though an ethics code might survive First 
Amendment scrutiny, such a code cannot eliminate an individual’s 
partisanship.  For example, in May 2007, Colorado Secretary of 
State Mike Coffman adopted rules that bar himself and certain 
employees from publicly endorsing or working for a political 
candidate, political party, or statewide ballot initiative.90  But the 
day after announcing the new policy, Secretary Coffman was the 
 85. Ballot Integrity Act, S. 1487, 110th Cong. § 325 (2007). 
 86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.052 (West Supp. 2007). 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 211B.09 (2006). 
 88. Urbina, supra note 57. 
 89. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 90. Colorado Secretary of State Information Center News Release, Coffman 
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“featured speaker” at a Mesa County Republican Party event in 
Grand Junction, Colorado.91  The Secretary’s spokesman explained 
that Secretary Coffman “still continues to be an active Republican 
in the state.”92  Indeed, in November 2007, Secretary Coffman 
formally filed his candidacy with the Federal Elections Commission 
to run for retiring Congressman Tom Tancredo’s seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.93
2. Making the Chief Election Official an Appointed, rather than
 Elected Position 
Several individuals and organizations have proposed that states 
do away altogether with elected officials overseeing elections.  The 
Carter-Baker Report recommended that states “consider 
transferring the authority for conducting elections from the 
secretary of state to a chief election officer, who would serve as a 
nonpartisan official.”94  The report goes on to suggest that states 
could select this official by having a super-majority of two-thirds of 
one or both chambers of the state legislature and that the nominee 
“should receive clear bipartisan support.”95
This idea is shared by Professor Hasen, who proposes that the 
states create a “cadre of individuals” whose allegiance is “to the 
integrity of the process itself and not to any particular electoral 
outcome.”96  Like the Carter-Baker Report, Hasen underscores the 
need for broad support and nonpartisanship of the appointed 
election official, also suggesting that the individual be nominated 
by the governor and approved by a super-majority of the state 
legislature.97  Hasen goes on to propose institutional protections 
such as a long-term appointment without the possibility of 
reappointment, removal only under the rules set out for 
impeaching a state executive, and a constitutionally guaranteed 
budget to guard against the legislature’s budgetary influence.98
Yet this idea is opposed by Secretary Rokita, who believes that 
elected officials are more accountable when they know that they 
 91. Urbina, supra note 57. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Lynn Bartels, Coffman Formally Files To Make Run for Congress, ROCKY MTN. 
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2007, at N10. 
 94. CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 65, at 50. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Hasen, supra note 1, at 983. 
 97. Id. at 984. 
 98. Id. 
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can be voted out of office if they fail to act impartially.99  Rokita’s 
comment would seem to have some credence given that the 
controversial Secretaries of State Harris, Blackwell, and Kiffmeyer 
have all left office either through a failed attempt to seek higher 
office or a loss at re-election.100  Moreover, Maine’s Secretary of 
State Matthew Dunlap, who was chosen by that state’s legislature 
rather than being popularly elected, told the New York Times that 
“it’s a pinpoint balancing act you have to play. . . . In order to get 
elected by the Legislature, you want your candidates to get 
elected.”101
Several of the protections offered by the Carter-Baker Report 
and Professor Hasen would alleviate some of the concerns raised by 
Secretary Dunlap’s comment.  Yet the reality is that these proposals 
require such a substantial structural and legal change to current 
election administration (in Minnesota, the proposals would require 
significant constitutional amendment) that one must wonder 
whether these ideas are even realistic. 
3. Governing by Commission: The Wisconsin Government
 Accountability Board 
Wisconsin has had commission oversight of elections for quite 
some time, but the Wisconsin system is undergoing substantial 
reform.  Having removed election and campaign oversight from 
the purview of the Wisconsin Secretary of State in 1974, Wisconsin 
was unique with an elections oversight board of members chosen 
by the Governor, the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, legislative leaders, and chairs of major political parties.102  
Although the Wisconsin Elections Board was bipartisan in make-up, 
the Board “produced decisions and formal opinions during often 
lively public meetings at which political considerations were never 
far from the surface.”103  As such, in January 2007 the Wisconsin 
 99. Urbina, supra note 57. 
 100. See Begos, supra note 54; Abraham, supra note 55; Franklin, supra note 56. 
 101. Urbina, supra note 577. 
 102. Press Release, Wisconsin State Elections Board, Elections Board Pledges 
to Work for Smooth Transition: Legislature Creates Government Accountability 
Board (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid= 
10581&locid=47. 
 103. Peter C. Christianson, Intended Advocate; Unintended Lobbyist; Regulating 
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Legislature enacted a sweeping reform that is merging state 
election administration with campaign finance, lobbying, and 
ethics into one oversight board, the members of which are all 
current or former judges.104
The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board consists of 
six members,105 each of whom must formerly have served as a judge 
elected to a court of record in Wisconsin.106  The Board members 
will serve six-year staggered terms.107  Board members are selected 
by a Government Accountability Candidate Committee, which 
consists of one judge chosen by lot by the Wisconsin Chief Justice 
(in the presence of the other Supreme Court Justices) from each of 
the four districts in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.108  No person 
may be nominated by the Government Accountability Candidate 
Committee unless the person receives its unanimous approval.109  
The Governor then nominates one candidate from the Candidate 
Committee’s nominations,110 subject to a two-thirds vote of the 
Wisconsin Senate.111
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board members’ 
political activities are subject to several limitations: 
(1)  Board members may not hold another state or local 
office except the office of circuit or court of appeals 
judge;112
(2)  Board members may not become a member of a 
political party, an officer or member of a committee in 
any partisan political club or organization or an officer or 
employee of a PAC;113
(3)  Board members may not become a candidate for state 
or local office;114
(4)  Board members may not make political contributions 
to state or local candidates;115 and 
 104. See WIS. STAT. § 5.05 (Supp. 2007). 
 105. WIS. STAT. § 15.60(1) (Supp. 2007). 
 106. Id. at subdiv. (3). 
 107. Id. at subdiv. (1). 
 108. Id. at subdiv. (2). 
 109. WIS. STAT. § 5.052(2) (Supp. 2007). 
 110. See id. at subdiv. (3). 
 111. WIS. STAT. § 15.07(1)(a)(2) (Supp. 2007). 
 112. WIS. STAT. § 15.60(4) (Supp. 2007). 
 113. See id. at subdiv. (5). 
 114. Id. at subdiv. (6). 
 115. Id. at subdiv. (7). 
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(5)  Board members may not be a lobbyist or employee of 
a lobbyist.116
The restrictions on a Board member’s political membership, 
contributions, and political activity apply for a period of one-year 
before the members’ term.117  An Elections Division is created 
within the Government Accountability Board,118 and the Board is 
directed by statute to designate an employee of the Board to serve 
as the chief election officer in the state.119
Wisconsin’s new venture into election oversight—a board of 
judges who are heavily restricted from political activity—is an 
intriguing way to address concerns of partisanship that apparently 
were not settled with the former elections oversight board.120  This 
creative approach meets the goals of nonpartisanship and broad 
support (through two-thirds approval by the Senate) set forth in 
the Carter-Baker Report and by Professor Hasen.121  Yet the idea of 
commission or board-oversight of elections has been met with 
opposition by at least one election law professor who supports “one 
main person in an office that should encourage voter turnout and 
clean elections.”122  With the revised Wisconsin model just getting 
off the ground, it remains to be seen whether it is actually more 
advantageous to have six board members, (as well as a chief 
elections officer employed by the board), who individually and 
collectively can encourage voting and clean elections. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The real issue in Minnesota is the magnitude of any change to 
our election oversight.  A code of conduct or conflict of interest 
rules could be instituted by the legislature or even by the Secretary 
    116. Id. at subdiv. (8). 
    117. See id. at subdivs. (5)–(7). 
     118. WIS. STAT. § 15.603(2) (Supp. 2007). 
     119. WIS. STAT. § 5.05(3)(g) (Supp. 2007). 
    120. See Christianson, supra note 103. 
    121. See CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 65, at 53; Hasen, supra note 1, at 
983. 
    122. Mark Brunswick, The Big Question Blog: An S.O.S. for the SoS,?, 
STARTRIBUNE.COM, Dec. 5, 2007, at http://nc.startribune.com/blogs/bigquestion/ 
?p=944#more-944, (quoting Edward B. “Ned” Foley, Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day 
Professor of Law at Moritz School of Law, The Ohio State University).  Professor 
Foley explains his position like this:  “A good feature of a Secretary of State office 
is energy, and initiative can come out of that office.  There is some advantage to 
political power and clout.  We wish that it wasn’t associated with that office being 
elected on a partisan basis.  That’s an unfortunate feature.”  Id. 
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of State himself.  But the example of Colorado shows that if 
partisanship—not formal endorsements—is the real concern, a 
code of conduct does little to alleviate that issue.  Moreover, 
Minnesota’s current Secretary of State has already gone on record 
that he will not serve on any political campaign committees or 
publicly endorse candidates for office.123
The real issues, then, are the increasing tendency toward 
litigation, the polling data that show a growing distrust of election 
results across the United States, and whether a structural change to 
election administration is in order.  Any such structural change in 
Minnesota would require a constitutional amendment.124  But if the 
concerns over partisan election officials may be attenuating with 
the departure from the political stage of Secretaries Harris, 
Blackwell, and Kiffmeyer, a structural change may be premature.  
In that case, Thomas Jefferson’s simple advice of “a little 
patience”125 may be in order. 
The risk of waiting is that the past problems can easily recur.  
As seen in Florida and Ohio, a single chief election officer can have 
extraordinary impact in an election.  Without any change in the 
law, there is little assurance that these problems have been solved.  
Indeed, Minnesota’s new Secretary of State contends in a way eerily 
similar to his predecessor that attacks against him are politically 
motivated.126
    123. Prah, supra note 199. 
    124. Such an amendment is not unheard of in Minnesota.  In the 1998 general 
election, Minnesota voters approved abolishing the elected constitutional office of 
State Treasurer effective January 6, 2003.  Act of April 9, 1998, ch. 387, 1998 Minn. 
Laws 965.  The administrative functions of the office were transferred by order of 
the Governor to the Minnesota Department of Administration.  STATE OF 
MINNESOTA, DEP’T OF ADMIN. REORGANIZATION ORDER NO. 185 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
    125. Following enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, Thomas 
Jefferson wrote a telling letter to John Taylor: 
A little patience, and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their 
spells dissolve, and the people, recovering their true sight, restore their 
government to it's [sic] true principles. It is true that in the mean time 
we are suffering deeply in spirit, and incurring the horrors of a war & 
long oppressions of enormous public debt. . . . If the game runs 
sometimes against us at home we must have patience till luck turns, & 
then we shall have an opportunity of winning back the principles we have 
lost, for this is a game where principles are the stake. 
To John Taylor, 4 June [1798], in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 387, 389 
(Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003). 
    126. In news coverage over an investigation by the Minnesota Legislative 
Auditor into his office, Minnesota Secretary of State Mark Ritchie told a local 
television station that the “experience has taught [me], among other things, 
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It is up to the Minnesota Legislature and the electorate to 
determine whether a structural change to Minnesota election 
oversight is necessary to protect the impartiality—and the 
perception of impartiality—in our elections.  Wisconsin’s latest 
experiment in having an appointed board of former judges, all 
bound by a strict code of conduct, is intriguing in its Midwestern 
practicality.  While the ink is barely dry on Wisconsin’s new law, the 
use of an independent commission or an independent official is 
already in use in at least sixteen other democracies in the world,127 
and it is a logical consideration for Minnesota. 
 
 
partisan bloggers, political parties and opposition lawmakers at times work in 
concert for a coordinated attack.  There is a concerted strategy to try to paint me 
as partisan.  I've run this office for nearly a year on a very nonpartisan basis.”  John 
Croman, Secretary of State Battles Critics in Campaign Newsletter Flap, KARE 11 NEWS, 
Nov. 22, 2007, at http://www.kare11.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=270172.  
Three years earlier, Mr. Ritchie’s predecessor, Mary Kiffmeyer, told the 
Washington Post that “her record speaks for itself: Under her watch, the state has 
had among the highest turnouts in the nation. ‘But I have the sense that if I 
walked on water, the Democrats would say I can’t swim.’”  Jo Becker, Behind the 
Scenes, Officials Wrestle Over Voting Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at A1. 
 127. See Overton, supra note 4, at 34. 
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